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Abstract
The prevalence of Internet censorship has prompted the
creation of several measurement platforms for monitoring
filtering activities. An important challenge faced by these
platforms revolves around the trade-off between depth of mea-
surement and breadth of coverage. In this paper, we present
an opportunistic censorship measurement infrastructure built
on top of a network of distributed VPN servers run by vol-
unteers, which we used to measure the extent to which the
I2P anonymity network is blocked around the world. This
infrastructure provides us with not only numerous and ge-
ographically diverse vantage points, but also the ability to
conduct in-depth measurements across all levels of the net-
work stack. Using this infrastructure, we measured at a global
scale the availability of four different I2P services: the official
homepage, its mirror site, reseed servers, and active relays in
the network. Within a period of one month, we conducted a
total of 54K measurements from 1.7K network locations in
164 countries. With different techniques for detecting domain
name blocking, network packet injection, and block pages,
we discovered I2P censorship in five countries: China, Iran,
Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. Finally, we conclude by discussing
potential approaches to circumvent censorship on I2P.
1 Introduction
Several platforms have been built to measure Internet censor-
ship at a large scale, including the OpenNet Initiative [38],
ICLab [58], Open Observatory of Network Interference
(OONI) [32], Quack [75], Iris [64], and Satellite [68]. A com-
mon challenge faced by these platforms is the trade-off be-
tween depth of measurement and breadth of coverage.
In this paper, we present a complementary measurement
infrastructure that can be used to address the above issue.
The infrastructure is built on top of a network of distributed
VPN servers operated by volunteers around the world. While
providing access to many residential network locations, thus
addressing the coverage challenge, these servers also offer the
required flexibility for conducting fine-grained measurements
on demand. We demonstrate these benefits by conducting an
in-depth investigation of the extent to which the I2P (invis-
ible Internet project) anonymity network is blocked across
different countries.
Due to the prevalence of Internet censorship and online
surveillance in recent years [7, 34, 62], many pro-privacy and
censorship circumvention tools, such as proxy servers, virtual
private networks (VPN), and anonymity networks have been
developed. Among these tools, Tor [23] (based on onion rout-
ing [39,71]) and I2P [85] (based on garlic routing [24,25,33])
are widely used by privacy-conscious and censored users, as
they provide a higher level of privacy and anonymity [42].
In response, censors often hinder access to these services
to prevent their use [27, 29, 79]. Therefore, continuous mea-
surements are essential to understand the extent of filtering
and help in restoring connectivity to these networks for end
users [19]. While many works have studied censorship on
Tor [27, 29, 79] (OONI [32] even has a dedicated module to
test connectivity to the Tor network), none have comprehen-
sively examined the blocking status of I2P. To fill this gap,
in this work we investigate the accessibility of I2P using the
proposed VPN-based measurement infrastructure.
By conducting 54K measurements from 1.7K vantage
points in 164 countries during a one-month period, we found
that China hindered access to I2P by poisoning DNS resolu-
tions of the I2P homepage and three reseed servers. SNI-based
blocking was detected in Oman and Qatar when accessing
the I2P homepage over HTTPS. TCP packet injection was
detected in Iran, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait when visiting the
mirror site via HTTP. Explicit block pages were discovered
when visiting the mirror site from Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Based on these findings, we conclude by discussing potential
approaches for improving I2P’s resistance to censorship.
2 Background
In this section, we review the VPN Gate ecosystem [73] and
the basic operation of the I2P anonymity network [85].
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2.1 VPN Gate
VPN Gate is an academic project developed at the University
of Tsukuba, Japan [60]. Its core component is a network of
distributed VPN vantage points hosted by volunteers from
around the world. Unlike commercial VPNs, these VPN van-
tage points are operated by Internet users who are willing to
share their home connection, with the primary goal to pro-
vide other users with access to the Internet. Volunteers use
a software package called SoftEther VPN [59] to turn their
personal computer into a VPN server. Other users can then
establish VPN connections to these servers using the client
component of the same VPN software package.
Advantages. Since VPN Gate’s vantage points (VGVPs)
are organized and operated by volunteers, they provide three
essential benefits that make them a potential resource for mea-
suring censorship at a global scale. First, VGVPs are often
located in residential networks, and can help to observe fil-
tering policies which may not be observed when measuring
from non-residential networks (e.g., data centers). Second,
VGVPs provide access to many network locations that are dif-
ficult to obtain through commercial VPNs. Our results (§5.2)
indeed show that having access to several network locations
is important for observing different blocking policies, even
within the same country.
Finally, unlike commercial VPNs that often monetize their
services by injecting advertisements [49, 51] or even “ly-
ing” about their geographical location [78], VGVPs man-
aged by individual operators are unlikely to carry out such
illicit practices—though this possibility cannot be excluded,
as rogue network relays have been found in Tor [15]. Even
if a VGVP is malicious, the chance that it is selected for
our measurements is small, given the thousands of available
VGVPs. We actually actively looked for and did not observe
any malicious JavaScript or ad injection in our measurements.
Limitations. As VGVPs are run by individuals on their per-
sonal computers, they cannot guarantee continuous uptime.
We can therefore only use them to conduct measurements
when they are online. Another drawback of using VGVPs is
that their availability is susceptible to blocking based on proto-
col signatures. Local Internet authorities can prevent VGVPs
from functioning by filtering the VPN protocols supported
by VPN Gate, including L2TP/IPsec, OpenVPN, MS-SSTP,
and SSL-VPN (of which OpenVPN is the most prevalent pro-
tocol). In that case, we would not have access to VGVPs in
locations where such filtering policies are applied. VPN Gate
mitigates this problem by allowing VGVPs to run on random
ports, instead of the default ports of the aforementioned VPN
protocols.
2.2 The Invisible Internet Project
I2P is a message-oriented anonymous overlay network com-
prising of relays (also referred to as nodes, routers, or peers)
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Figure 1: I2P routing mechanism [48].
that run the I2P router software to communicate with each
other. I2P messages are routed through two types of unidi-
rectional tunnels: inbound and outbound. In the example of
Figure 1, each tunnel is illustrated with two hops for sim-
plicity. For a higher level of anonymity, these tunnels can be
configured to have up to seven hops.
To communicate with Bob, Alice sends out messages on
her outbound tunnels towards the inbound tunnels of Bob.
Messages from Bob are sent to Alice in the same way. Alice
and Bob learn each other’s gateway relay address by querying
a network database. The anonymity of both Alice and Bob
is preserved since they only know the gateway address, but
not the actual address of each other. Note that gateways of
inbound tunnels are published, while gateways of outbound
tunnels are only known by the relay using them.
The I2P network database (netDb) originates from the
Kademlia distributed hash table [54] and plays a vital role
in the network, as it is used by relays to look up information
of other relays. A newly joined relay learns a portion of the
netDb via a bootstrapping process, fetching other relays’ in-
formation from a group of special relays called reseed servers.
Any I2P relay, when communicating with its intended desti-
nation, can also route traffic for other relays. In Figure 1, the
hops that are selected to form the tunnels are also actual I2P
users. While routing messages for Alice and Bob, these hops
can also communicate with their intended destinations.
Although Tor and I2P share similar properties, there are
some operational differences. Tor traffic is transmitted over
TCP, while I2P traffic can be transmitted over either TCP
or UDP. Tor has a centralized design with a set of trusted
directory authorities keeping track of the network. In contrast,
I2P is designed to be a completely decentralized network,
with no trusted entity having a complete view of the network.
There are 6.3K Tor routers serving an average of two mil-
lion concurrent users, estimated from data collected on a daily
basis in May, 2019 [6, 72]. There are more than 25K I2P
relays, estimated during the same period [61]. While Tor is
primarily tailored for latency-sensitive activities (e.g., web
browsing) due to bandwidth scarcity [55], I2P is more tolerant
towards bandwidth-intensive peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing
applications (e.g., BitTorrent) [74].
3 Methodology
In this section, we present our approach of using the dis-
tributed network of VPN Gate servers to conduct opportunis-
tic censorship measurements at a global scale, and approaches
to measure the accessibility of different I2P services.
3.1 Vantage Points
From March 10th to April 10th, 2019, we observed 192K
VGVPs from 3.5K autonomous systems (ASes) located in
181 countries. Our measurements were conducted in an op-
portunistic fashion by immediately connecting to a VGVP
and running our tests as soon as the node is discovered. There
are currently more than 5K VGVPs available at any given
time [73], providing us with an abundance of vantage points to
continuously measure from various network locations. When
many VGVPs become available at the same time, we prior-
itize ones located in regions where we have not previously
measured.
Due to the high churn rate of VGVPs (§2.1) and the rate
limit that we applied (§4), we could conduct a total of 54K
measurements from 1.7K ASes in 164 countries. This cover-
age is still comparable to its of other measurement platforms
and enough to provide meaningful insights.
3.2 I2P Blocking Detection
To access the I2P anonymity network, users typically go
through the following steps:
• Download the router software package from the official
I2P website (geti2p.net) or one of its mirror sites to set
up an I2P client.
• The client bootstraps into the network by fetching infor-
mation about other I2P relays from reseed servers.
• The client can then communicate with its intended desti-
nations via other relays that were previously fetched.
Based on this process, a censor can hinder access to I2P using
several blocking techniques, such as domain name block-
ing [5, 26, 31, 36, 53, 64, 68], TCP packet injection [18, 77],
and redirection to block pages [38]. The design of our cen-
sorship detection techniques is thus centered around these
different blocking techniques.
Domain Name Blocking. From VGVPs, we issued DNS
queries to both local and open resolvers1 to resolve the domain
names of the official I2P homepage (geti2p.net), its mirror
site (i2p-projekt.de), and reseed servers. Resolutions of these
domain names are vulnerable to DNS-based blocking because
they can be seen by any on-path observers, making them an
effective vector for censors to block access to I2P as well as
other undesired content [5, 26, 31, 53, 64, 68].
1We use public DNS resolvers, including Google’s 8.8.8.8 and
8.8.4.4, Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1, and Cisco Umbrella OpenDNS’s
208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220.
By inspecting the traffic captured during these name resolu-
tions and comparing the returned IP addresses with the legiti-
mate ones, we could detect if a DNS response was tampered.
More specifically, we aggregated DNS responses returned
from known uncensored locations (e.g., the U.S., Canada)
to generate a consensus list of legitimate responses, which
was then used as ground truth. We also queried an “innocu-
ous” domain (example.com) to differentiate between spurious
network errors (if any) and filtering events.
As DNS resolutions are a prerequisite to obtain the cor-
rect IP address(es) of a domain name, it is often sufficient
to conduct DNS-based blocking. Prior work, therefore, has
extensively looked at DNS-based blocking [64, 68]. With
the introduction of DNS over HTTPS/TLS [43, 45], DNS-
based blocking may no longer be an effective filtering chan-
nel. Nevertheless, the current design of TLS also exposes
visited domain names in the Server Name Indication (SNI)
extension [46]. SNI provides a second channel for on-path ob-
servers to monitor HTTPS-based sites, and thus it can be used
to interrupt connections to censored destinations [35, 36].
To also examine whether SNI-based blocking is being used
by censors in light of encrypted DNS traffic, we connected
to the legitimate IP address of the official I2P homepage 2
over the VPN tunnel of VGVPs, and then monitored if the
connection was interrupted during the TLS handshake.
TCP Packet Injection. The injection of TCP RST (reset)
or FIN (finish) packets is another common method for block-
ing connections to censored websites [58] and services [27].
To observe this filtering technique, it is desirable to capture
and analyze network traffic while establishing connections to
tested destinations. While i) crawling the I2P homepage and
its mirrors, and ii) establishing TCP connections to the reseed
servers and five I2P relays (set up by us—see §4), we also
captured network traffic passing through the VPN interface
between our testing machines and VGVPs. The captured net-
work traffic was then analyzed to see if there was any injection
interfering with our connections.
Block Pages. Block pages are a form of overt censorship in
which censors explicitly let users know about their blocking
intention [38]. Block pages can be delivered through various
methods. A censor can poison the DNS resolution of censored
websites to route users to the block page. We observe this
type of blocking from an institutional network in South Korea
(see §5.1). Another method is to interfere with the TCP stream
to redirect users to the block page, which we observe in Oman,
Qatar, and Kuwait (see §5.3). As the official I2P site did
not change much during our measurement period, we could
simply compare the HTML body of the legitimate site with
those fetched over VGVPs to detect block pages. For future
reference, when crawling the I2P site and its mirror, we also
captured a screenshot of any delivered block page.
2Currently, only the official homepage is served over HTTPS. Mirror sites
are still served over HTTP.
4 Ethical Considerations
As Internet censorship is often politically motivated [19, 40],
measurements involving volunteer-operated devices need to
be conducted in a careful manner [4, 50, 69]. While there
are some commercial VPN services that also provide access
to residential networks (e.g., Geosurf [37], Hola [1], Lumi-
nati [2]), there have been reports of illicit behaviors by some
of these VPNs [56], making them inappropriate to use for aca-
demic purposes. We instead opt to conduct our measurements
using VPN Gate’s volunteer-run nodes for several reasons.
VPN Gate is an academic project and does not have any
motivation to monetize its service like commercial VPN
providers [49, 51]. To become a VPN server, the SoftEther
VPN software requires an operator to manually go through a
process with repeated warning messages about the associated
risks of joining the VPN Gate research network [44]. We
therefore expect that VGVP operators fully understand the
potential issues of sharing their connection.
The VPN Gate software, as well as the infrastructure at
the University of Tsukuba, both have logging mechanisms
to assist VPN operators in case of complaints or disputes.
Although log retention can be a security and privacy risk for
VPN users, these logs serve as an anti-abuse policy used by the
project to protect its volunteers. The University of Tsukuba,
and the VPN Gate project in particular, operates under Japan
laws, and thus will only provide logs if there are valid reasons
to obtain them by authorized entities. Foreign authorities who
want these logs will have to adhere to Japan laws and request
them via the Minister for Foreign Affairs [66].
Our study of the I2P anonymity network, which comprises
thousands of users, must be performed in a responsible man-
ner that both respects user privacy [69, 84] and ensures that
our measurements do not interfere with the normal operation
of the I2P network [47]. Therefore, we apply an average rate
limit of three measurements per minute to make sure that our
experiments do not saturate any I2P or VPN Gate services,
thus affecting other users.
Our measurements involve connecting to other I2P relays
whose IP address(es) may be considered as sensitive infor-
mation under certain circumstances, as they could be used to
identify individuals. To prevent this privacy risk, we set up our
own I2P relays for this study and only test the connectivity
between VGVPs and these relays. Setting up our own relays
provides several benefits. First, they help to avoid any privacy
risks associated with using other relays. Second, they improve
the accuracy of our measurements, since I2P is a dynamic
network in which relays join and leave the network frequently.
The high churn rate of relays may negatively affect our ob-
servations. Finally, measurements on our own I2P relays will
not interrupt normal usage of other relays in the network.
More importantly, we strictly adhered to the I2P commu-
nity’s guidelines [47] for conducting studies on the I2P net-
work. In accordance with these guidelines, we contacted the
I2P team to discuss the purposes of our measurements. While
capturing the network traffic of our measurements, we did
not capture any traffic of other I2P or VPN Gate users. In
particular, we only “listened” for traffic passing through the
VPN interface between our testing machines and VGVPs.
This network traffic contains only packets generated by our
tests, as discussed in §3.2.
5 Data Analysis
Between March 10th to April 10th, 2019, we conducted a total
of 54K measurements from 1.7K ASes in 164 countries, and
detected I2P blocking activities in five countries: China, Iran,
Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. In the following section, we discuss
the different types of blocking we observed. A summary of
our findings is provided in Table 2 in the Appendix.
5.1 Domain Name Blocking
DNS-based Blocking. China was dominant in terms of
DNS-based blocking events across all VGVPs used. Based
on the method described in §3.2, we detected DNS poisoning
attempts when resolving domains of the I2P homepage and re-
seed servers. While open resolvers are often used by Internet
users to bypass local censorship, we found that China’s Great
Firewall (GFW) [53, 82] also poisons DNS responses from
our selected open resolvers when resolving censored domains.
However, we could obtain the correct DNS records for the
“innocuous” domain (i.e., example.com), which means that
despite monitoring all DNS resolutions passing by, the GFW
does not block access to open resolvers and only poisons
responses for censored domains.
Table 1 lists the ASes from which we detected poisoned
DNS responses. The second column shows censored domains.
The third column shows /24 subnets that were most frequently
abused by the GFW to inject falsified DNS responses. While
Pakistan, Syria, and Iran poison DNS responses with NX-
DOMAIN [11, 14, 57] or reserved local IP addresses [10],
making them easier to distinguish, China often falsifies DNS
responses with public IP addresses belonging to other non-
Chinese organizations [12, 31, 53, 64, 82].
Of these abused IP addresses, several were observed by
previous studies. Similar to an initial observation by Lowe
et al. [53], we observed 64.33.88.161, 203.161.230.171, and
4.36.66.178 among the most abused addresses. Similar to the
findings of Pearce et al. [64] and Farnan et al. [31], 8.7.198.45,
59.24.3.173, and 78.16.49.15 were observed, though they
were not within the group of most abused addresses. In ad-
dition to those seen by previous work, to our surprise, we
found many new abused IP addresses, most of which belong
to Facebook and SoftLayer.
Although the IP addresses that are used to poison DNS re-
sponses are similar across most ASes, showing a centralized
Chinese ASes Censored domains Most abused /24 subnets
AS134762, AS17816, AS4134, AS4808 geti2p.net, i2p-projekt.de(*) 64.33.88.0, 203.161.230.0, 31.13.72.0, 4.36.66.0,
AS4812, AS4837, AS56005, AS56040 reseed.i2p-projekt.de, netdb.i2p2.no 74.86.151.0, 74.86.12.0, 69.63.184.0, 69.171.229.0,
AS56041, AS56042, AS56046, AS9808(*) i2p.mooo.com, i2p.novg.net(*) 66.220.152.0, 66.220.149.0, 31.13.84.0
Table 1: Censored domains in China and top IP addresses that are most frequently abused for poisoning DNS responses.
list of IPs that are being abused by the GFW, the block list of
domains and blocking mechanisms seem to be implemented
differently at different network locations. For instance, in ad-
dition to four domains poisoned at most ASes in China, we
observed DNS poisoning attempts at AS9808 (Guangdong
Mobile Communication) when resolving i2p-projekt.de and
i2p.novg.net. Analyzing packets captured from this AS, we
notice that the way poisoned responses were crafted is dif-
ferent from other ASes. More specifically, while poisoned
responses at other locations contain only the falsified IP ad-
dresses shown in Table 1, poisoned responses at AS9808
have an additional resource record of a loopback IP address
(i.e, 127.0.0.1). Nevertheless, this phenomenon could also
happen due to implementation bugs of the GFW, as it only
occurred sporadically but not consistently during the period
of our study. Previous work has shown that the GFW may not
always function as desired [30].
In conclusion, our measurements show that the I2P home-
page is censored by DNS-based blocking, while its mirror is
still accessible from most network locations in China. Of the
ten reseed servers that were active during our measurement
period, three were consistently blocked by DNS poisoning.
Our observations align with findings of earlier studies. We
previously conducted active measurements from China to test
the reachability of reseed servers and found that some of them
were still accessible [41]. Moreover, our I2P metrics site [61]
shows a consistent number of Chinese relays during our mea-
surement period. A recent study by Ververis et al. [76] also
shows that the I2P Android App is still available for down-
load from the Tencent App Store despite the removal of many
other censorship circumvention applications.
SNI-based Blocking. As mentioned in §3.2, we investi-
gated if censors employed SNI-based blocking together with
DNS-based blocking, as these are the two main channels
where visited domains are exposed. Surprisingly, we could
successfully fetch the official I2P homepage from the net-
work locations in China, where the website was previously
blocked by the GFW’s DNS poisoning. Although OONI re-
cently reported that China uses SNI-based blocking together
with DNS-based blocking to censor all domains belonging
to Wikipedia [70], our findings show that this technique is
not fully employed for all censored domains. In other words,
the GFW may apply different blocking techniques against
different domains and services.
Institutional Filtering and Leakage of DNS Injection.
Apart from poisoned responses observed in China, we also
detected DNS-based blocking at AS38676, AS9848, and
AS1781 in Korea. For AS1781, which is managed by the
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, poi-
soned DNS responses contain only one static IP addresses
(143.248.4.221). Upon visiting the webpage hosted under this
IP address, it becomes obvious that the Institute has deployed
a firewall to filter anonymity services. Note that filtering ac-
tivities observed at institutional networks should be carefully
analyzed and not characterized as national-level filtering. Of
the 1.7K networks we had access to, there were 64 institu-
tional networks in 17 countries. However, after excluding
VGVPs from these networks, we still had access to other
VGVPs located in residential networks in these 17 countries.
Next, we noticed that the pattern of poisoned responses in
AS38676 and AS9848 was not consistent. More specifically,
we only observed poisoned responses sporadically on some
days, while we could obtain correct responses on some other
days. Further investigation from the captured network traffic
showed that poisoned responses were only injected when
querying the open resolvers but not local resolvers. Therefore,
it is clear that operators of these two networks do not block
access to I2P. Moreover, the set of falsified IP addresses is
similar to those observed in China, as shown in Table 1. This
is likely the case of China’s censorship leakage because China
inspects and censors both egress and ingress network traffic
passing through the GFW. Due to the geographical proximity
of Korea and China, it is likely that our DNS queries sent from
Korea to open resolvers passed through China’s network, and
thus got poisoned [9, 22].
5.2 TCP Packet Injection
During our measurement period, we detected injection of TCP
packets while visiting the official I2P homepage and its mirror
site in four countries. More specifically, we found that the I2P
mirror site was blocked in Iran, while the official website was
still accessible over HTTPS. Analyzing the captured network
traffic, we could detect TCP packets injected immediately
after the HTTP GET request containing the hostname was sent
out. The injected TCP packets contain HTTP 403 Forbidden,
thus disrupting the normal connection.
We also found injected TCP packets from VGVPs located
in Oman and Qatar. These two censors use the same blocking
techniques to prevent access to both official and mirror sites.
When connecting to the HTTP mirror site, TCP packets were
injected immediately after the HTTP GET request, redirect-
ing users to block pages (see §5.3). When connecting to the
official site (over HTTPS), SNI-based blocking was used to
interrupt the connection. More specifically, although the TCP
handshake between geti2p.net and our VGVPs in these two
countries could successfully complete, immediately after the
TLS client-hello message was sent out, a TCP RST packet
was then injected, terminating the TCP stream.
Similar blocking activities with Iran were also detected in
Kuwait. More specifically, the I2P homepage was still accessi-
ble, while its mirror site was blocked by means of TCP packet
injection, redirecting users to a block page (see §5.3). How-
ever, unlike Iran, Oman, and Qatar, where we found filtering
events in many network locations, we consistently observed
blocking activities only at AS47589 (Kuwait Telecommuni-
cation Company), while all I2P services could be accessed
normally from other network locations in this country.
5.3 Block Pages
Although explicit block pages can be delivered to censored
users through either DNS poisoning or TCP packet injection,
as discussed above, we mostly observed block pages at a na-
tional level being delivered through TCP packet injection.
Comparing the HTML body of the legitimate official home-
page and the HTML fetched via VGVPs, we could simply
pinpoint block pages returned by censors and detect explicit
block pages in Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
Based on the content of the delivered message on each
block page (some examples are provided in Appendix A), it is
clear that blocking access to I2P is required by the state law in
each of these three countries. Note that although we observed
the same block pages in all network locations in Oman and
Qatar, of six networks in Kuwait (AS3225, AS42961, AS9155,
AS6412, AS196921, and AS47589) from which we conducted
our measurements, we only detected censorship in AS47589.
The block page explicitly explains the site is restricted under
Internet services law in the State of Kuwait. This observation
shows that there is always region-to-region and ISP-to-ISP
variation, thus necessitating comprehensive measurements to
be conducted from several network locations to accurately
attribute censorship (i.e., at a local or national level).
5.4 Comparison with other Platforms
Among currently active censorship measurement platforms,
OONI [32] is comparable to ours in terms of coverage, with
about 160 countries and 2K network locations as of 2019.
ICLab [58] is similar to ours in terms of censorship detection
techniques and the design decision of using VPN vantage
points to measure network filtering.
OONI provides installation packages for several platforms,
including Raspberry Pi, OS X, Linux, Google Play, F-Droid,
and Apple’s App Store, making it easier for testers from
around the world to download and run the package. OONI,
however, does not have full control over the measurements
conducted by its volunteers. As a result, these measurements
may be interrupted by unexpected spurious network connec-
tivity issues at the testing client side, making the collected
data unusable or even unreliable in some cases [83].
We analyzed OONI data collected during the same study
period as ours to examine if OONI detected similar block-
ing events. The domain name of the I2P homepage has been
on the global test list of OONI since February, 2019 [16].
However, we could not find any OONI tests of the I2P web-
site conducted from the countries in which we detected I2P
censorship (§5), except for one test conducted in Iran. Upon
closer inspection of this test attempt, conducted by an OONI
volunteer in Iran [3], we found that the test could not provide
reliable data due to a control failure.
We collaborated with the authors of ICLab [58] to use
their platform for conducting I2P censorship measurements.
However, we did not detect any filtering activities from mea-
surement data obtained by ICLab. Understandably, ICLab has
more limited coverage of 62 countries, as of December 2018.
Among the five countries in which we detected I2P blocking
events, IClab only had vantage points in Iran and China. How-
ever, connections to them were intermittent, thus could not
provide us with reliable data. This is one of the advantages of
our proposed infrastructure compared with commercial VPN
services, as gaining access to networks in countries with less
freedom of expression can be challenging.
6 Related Work
Many works have conducted censorship measurements in sep-
arate countries. The GFW of China has been extensively stud-
ied due to its significance [17, 27, 30, 63, 80, 81]. Some other
well-known censors, including Iran [8, 10], India [83], Pak-
istan [52, 57], Syria [14], Yemen [21], Egypt, and Libya [20],
have also been investigated. Throughout our this paper, we
examined the blocking situation of different I2P services in
many countries. In addition to those that have been studied
previously, our study discovered explicit blockage in three
more countries: Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
ICLab [58], OONI [32], Quack [75], Iris [64], and Satel-
lite [68] are active platforms capable of measuring censorship
at a global scale. Despite sharing a similar goal with us, each
platform has its own drawbacks which can be complemented
by our proposed measurement infrastructure. While the de-
sign of ICLab is similar to ours, it is challenging for the plat-
form to obtain reliable vantage points from commercial VPN
providers in some countries of interest where we have discov-
ered I2P blocking activities. Although OONI is widely known
for its worldwide censorship measurement activities, Yadav et
al. show that this platform can result in some inaccuracy [83].
Satellite-Iris [13], a combination between two prior works
(Satellite [68] and Iris [64]), uses open DNS resolvers in the
IPv4 space to detect DNS-based network filtering. With a
similar design that uses Zmap [28] to probe the whole IPv4
space to detect open servers, Quack [75] scans for public echo
servers and takes advantage of these servers to measure cen-
sorship. The primary goal of Quack is to detect censorship
of websites, but not send or receive actual HTTP(S) pack-
ets. Instead, the platform crafts packets that mimic HTTP(S)
requests, which echo servers will reflect back to the testing
client. Nonetheless, Quack’s authors have acknowledged the
possibility of false negatives when the censor only looks for
HTTP(S) traffic on the usual ports (80 and 443) since the echo
protocol operates over port 7 [65].
7 Discussion
We have introduced an infrastructure that can remedy the
common challenge faced by current Internet censorship mea-
surement platforms, which is the trade-off between depth of
measurement and breadth of coverage. The infrastructure is
built on top of a network of distributed VPN servers, providing
us with not only an abundance of vantage points around the
world, but also the flexibility of the VPN technology in apply-
ing different testing techniques to measure network filtering
activities at a global scale.
Due to the limitations discussed in §2, however, we do not
consider the proposed infrastructure as a replacement of ex-
isting measurement platforms. Instead, it should be used as a
complementary tool for conducting additional measurements
from locations inaccessible to current platforms, providing
more data to analyze and improve the accuracy of censorship
measurements. For example, OONI volunteers can connect
to VGVPs and run tests to increase the coverage and accu-
racy of OONI’s data. Similarly, ICLab could integrate VPN
Gate’s OpenVPN configuration files into its measurement
platform to increase the coverage of both network locations
and countries of interest.
Our findings show that the most dominant filtering tech-
nique is based on domain names. Currently, visited domain
names can be observed in two channels: DNS queries and the
SNI extension (if HTTPS is supported), making them effec-
tive filtering vectors for on-path observers. While DNS over
HTTPS/TLS [43, 45] and ESNI [67] are still being developed
and have not been widely adopted yet, we believe that domain
name blocking will no longer be an effective blocking strategy
once these new techniques become standardized.3
Assuming a future Internet with all traffic encrypted, it is
likely that censors will switch to employing IP-based blocking.
Our measurement data shows that the official I2P homepage,
its mirror site, and reseed servers are hosted on static IP ad-
dresses. As a result, it is trivial for a censor to block access
to these services by blacklisting all associated hosting IP ad-
dresses. In order to cope with this problem, operators of these
domain names should consider hosting them on dynamic IP
address(es) that may also host many other websites, to dis-
courage censors from conducting IP-based blocking due to
3Unless users are forced to use the DNS resolvers provided by their
local Internet authority, and they cannot use any other third-party open DNS
resolvers that support DNS over HTTPS/TLS.
the cost of collateral damage of blocking many “innocuous”
co-hosted sites.
The I2P developers have foreseen a scenario in which all
reseed servers get blocked, thus preventing new relays from
joining the network. They therefore have created a function in
the I2P router software for manual reseeding. Using this func-
tion, any active I2P relay can manually extract information
of a set of its known active relays and share it with censored
relays that do not have access to any reseed servers. Under
this situation, a censor who wants to prevent local users from
accessing the I2P network will have to harvest all IP addresses
of active I2P relays and block them all. While in our previous
work we showed that this harvesting attack could be con-
ducted at a relatively low cost [41], we did not observe any
such blocking activities while conducting connectivity tests
between VGVPs and our own I2P relays.
8 Conclusion
Over a one-month period, we used a network of VPN servers
distributed across 164 countries to conduct 54K measure-
ments with the goal of investigating the blocking of I2P at
a global scale. We found that several I2P services (e.g., the
homepage, its mirror site, and a subset of reseed servers) were
blocked using different filtering techniques in five countries.
China blocks access to the official I2P homepage and a part
of reseed servers by poisoning DNS resolutions. Iran inter-
rupts connections to the mirror site by injecting forged TCP
packets containing HTTP 403 Forbidden code. SNI-based
blocking was detected when visiting the official I2P home-
page over HTTPS in Oman and Qatar, while explicit block
pages were detected when visiting the mirror site via HTTP.
Block page redirection was also detected in the network of
Kuwait Telecommunication Company when visiting the I2P
mirror site. Finally, we discussed potential approaches to help
I2P tackle censorship based on the above findings.
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A Appendix
Figure 2: Example block page from Kuwait.
Figure 3: Example block page from Qatar.
Figure 4: Example block page from Oman.
Country
Domain-name-based blocking
TCP packet injection Block page
DNS SNI
China
geti2p.net
reseed.i2p-projekt.de
netdb.i2p2.no
i2p.mooo.com
N/A N/A N/A
Iran N/A N/A i2p-projekt.de N/A
Oman N/A geti2p.net
geti2p.net
i2p-projekt.de
i2p-projekt.de
Qatar N/A geti2p.net
geti2p.net
i2p-projekt.de
i2p-projekt.de
Kuwait N/A N/A i2p-projekt.de i2p-projekt.de
Table 2: Summary of censored countries, filtered I2P services, and blocking techniques detected.
